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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    ollowing the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) signaled a decisive shift toward counterterrorism as one of its top 
enforcement priorities.1 Nearly twenty years later, the results of this shift 
present a mixed bag. While the post-9/11 landscape has undoubtedly bol-
stered federal efforts in investigating and prosecuting terrorists,2 enforce-
ment gaps still exist with regard to certain terrorist activities. One such ac-
tivity is nuclear terrorism, defined as the use of or interference with a nuclear 
weapon, nuclear material, or a nuclear facility in order to further an act of 
terrorism.3 Despite relatively few federal nuclear terrorism prosecutions,4 nu-
clear terrorism is widely acknowledged as a critical security issue due to the 
singularly destructive power of nuclear weapons and the geopolitical dimen-
sion of the threat.5 
 
1. See Adam Clymer, How Sept. 11 Changed Goals of Justice Dept., NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 28, 
2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/28/us/how-sept-11-changed-goals-of-justice-
dept.html (“Attorney General John Ashcroft has been testifying before Congress this week, 
arguing for substantial spending increases for counterterrorism programs. His appearances, 
in which he is seeking nearly $2 billion in additional spending next year, are a vivid example 
of the changed priorities of many cabinet agencies in a post-Sept. 11 world . . . .”). See also 
Structural Changes to Enhance Counter-Terrorism Efforts, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AR-
CHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/archive/911/counterterrorism.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2021) (noting that “[s]ince 9/11, the FBI has undertaken the most significant transformation 
in its history . . . as part of its larger cultural shift to a threat-based, intelligence-driven, 
national security organization”). 
2. See generally Christopher A. Shields et al., Prosecuting Terrorism: Challenges in the Post-9/11 
World, 20 SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW AND DEVIANCE 173 (2015) (finding that since 9/11, 
U.S. terrorism prosecution and conviction rates have risen to unprecedented levels). 
3. See Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Apr. 2010), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-
terrorism-fact-sheet. Title 18 of the U.S. Code refers to “nuclear material,” also known as 
fissile material, which is material capable of sustaining a nuclear fission chain reaction and 
subsequently being weaponized through a nuclear detonation. See 18 U.S.C. § 831(g)(1) 
(West); Fissile Material, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (last updated Aug. 25, 
2020), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fissile-material.html. 
4. See infra Section I.B. 
5. See Sara Z. Kutchesfahani & Kelsey Davenport, Why Countries Still Must Prioritize Ac-
tion to Curb Nuclear Terrorism, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://thebulletin.org/2018/08/why-countries-still-must-prioritize-action-to-curb-nu-
clear-terrorism/. 
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Thus far, however, efforts to address nuclear terrorism have faced a fun-
damental dilemma: while the importance of preventing nuclear terrorism is 
unquestioned, there has been limited opportunity or need to conduct federal 
prosecutions that hinge on nuclear terrorism charges. Nonetheless, there are 
compelling reasons why the DOJ should promulgate a clear framework for 
nuclear terrorism prosecutions. First, in a field in which the collapse of arms-
reduction treaties and nuclear smuggling leads to constant uncertainty about 
the future of nonproliferation efforts, the DOJ should be prepared for all 
contingencies.6 Second, although laws such as the material support statutes 
are often relied upon as catch-all charges, there are situations unique to nu-
clear terrorism in which these laws might not be applicable.7 Third, the les-
sons learned from developing such a framework could assist prosecutors in-
volved in other areas of national security law. 
With these considerations in mind, this article proceeds in three parts. 
Part I first sets the legal landscape, introducing key statutory provisions and 
several federal nuclear terrorism-related prosecutions. Part II then evaluates 
the principal statutory shortcomings in the U.S. criminal system’s current 
approach to nuclear terrorism. Finally, Part III argues that to address these 
shortcomings, rather than awaiting legislative amendment, the DOJ should 
craft a nuclear terrorism prosecution framework (NTPF). This proposed 
 
6. See, e.g., Linton F. Brooks, The End of Arms Control?, 149 DAEDALUS 84, 84 (2020) 
(arguing that the failure of meaningful bilateral arms reduction efforts between the United 
States and Russia imperils the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime). While the U.S. gov-
ernment’s approach to nuclear terrorism has historically focused on policy-centric measures, 
contingency preparedness demands a stronger, DOJ-centric approach to prosecutions of 
would-be nuclear terrorists. See, e.g., Justin Bresolin, Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program, CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION (June 
2014), https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduc-
tion-program/ (providing an overview of one of the principal policy-based initiatives in 
furtherance of counterproliferation, the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Pro-
gram). 
7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339B (West). One notable situation in which these provi-
sions might not be applicable is so-called “lone wolf” terrorism, a concern which may be 
relevant to the nuclear terrorism context. See Beau D. Barnes, Confronting the One-Man Wolf 
Pack: Adapting Law Enforcement and Prosecution Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism, 92 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1613 (2012); Patrick D. Ellis, Lone Wolf Terrorism and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures, 26 TERRORISM 
AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 211, 212 (2014) (“This article examines the kinds of WMD at-
tacks lone wolves and autonomous cells could conduct and some of the countermeasures 
that might be used to stop them.”). 
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framework consists of two guidelines premised on the principles of consistency 
and coordination and several recommended courses of action. 
 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
 
Two sources of law, statutes and case law, shape the contours of federal 
nuclear terrorism prosecutions. However, these sources lend themselves to 
a somewhat disjointed understanding of nuclear terrorism law, given that 
judicial decisions have not meaningfully expanded upon the web of relevant 
statutory provisions. In order to promote the consistent prosecution of nu-
clear terrorism, therefore, it is worthwhile to properly situate these statutory 
and judicial authorities. 
 
A. Statutory Provisions 
 
Nine titles of the U.S. Code contain provisions that bear on nuclear security 
and nonproliferation issues.8 However, from a prosecutorial vantage, two 
titles are most relevant for the penalties they impose on unlawful nuclear 
activities: Titles 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) and 42 (Public Health). 
The statutory schema that these titles establish centers on five provisions: 18 
U.S.C. §§ 831, 832, 2332i, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2077 and 2284 (the “nuclear 
threat provisions”).9 In part due to the disparate contexts in which these 
provisions were enacted, they overlap in motivations, subject areas, and pen-
alties.10 In light of this discordance, two variables that offer some clarity are 
the era of initial enactment (pre-9/11 or post-9/11) and the initial source of 
 
8. See United States Code, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, https://us-
code.house.gov/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
9. It is important to note, however, that a federal prosecutor would likely also bring 
charges under the host of criminal provisions that apply to “typical” terrorism prosecutions, 
including 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B (material support statutes) and 18 U.S.C. § 2332a 
(use of WMDs). Likewise, several other provisions bear on nuclear security issues, but are 
not featured in this article as “nuclear threat provisions” because they either acknowledge 
or are related to the five listed statutes.  
10. See infra notes 11–19 and accompanying text. For further analysis of the security 
contexts that inspired these statutes, see JONATHAN MEDALIA, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: A 
BRIEF REVIEW OF THREATS AND RESPONSES, RL32595, CONG. RESCH. SERV. (last updated 
Feb. 10, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32595.pdf; John P. Holdren, 7 Threats to 
Civil Nuclear-Energy Facilities, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM: 
PROCEEDINGS OF AN INDO-U.S. WORKSHOP 61 (Roddam Narasimha et al. eds, 2007). 
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motivation (international convention or domestic legislation). The following 
figure separates the provisions accordingly: 
 
Figure 1. Nuclear Threat Provisions Analytical Binary 
 
 
 
Quadrant I contains the pre-9/11 provisions inspired by domestic legis-
lative imperatives, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2077 and 2284. Considering the security con-
texts in which §§ 2077 and 2284 were enacted, these provisions were early 
attempts to punish nuclear sabotage at a time when the U.S. government had 
not yet criminalized dangerous nuclear activities. The legislators that crafted 
these provisions operated in an early-Cold War security context and conse-
quently articulated nuclear threats from a State-centric perspective.11 First, § 
 
11. See Reshmi Kazi, The Correlation Between Non-State Actors and Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion, 10 CONNECTIONS, Fall 2011, at 1, 1 (highlighting various reasons for the earlier em-
phasis on State-centric threats rather than nonstate actor nuclear concerns, including limits 
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2077, enacted under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (AEA), prohibits the 
shipment, transfer, or possession of “special nuclear material.”12 Violators 
intending to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to any foreign 
nation can be fined up to $20,000 and imprisoned for life. § 2284, also en-
acted under the AEA, punishes the sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel. This 
statute was enacted to punish interference with new and relatively unguarded 
nuclear power technologies.13 Consequently, it provides for penalties up to 
$10,000 and twenty-years imprisonment, or if death results, life imprison-
ment. 
Quadrant II’s 18 U.S.C. § 831, enacted over thirty years after the AEA, 
reflects the U.S. government’s evolving awareness that threats in the post-
nuclear age arise from both State and non-State actors. § 831 was codified 
pursuant to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
which provides for the international prevention, detection, and punishment 
of offenses relating to nuclear material.14 As such, § 831 criminalizes the in-
tentional reception, possession, or use of any nuclear material or nuclear by-
product material when these actions lead to (or are likely to lead to) death, 
serious bodily injury, or substantial damage to property or the environment.15 
It also criminalizes the deprivation or cross-border movement of nuclear 
materials and provides for penalties up to twenty-years imprisonment, or if 
death results, life imprisonment. 
 
to WMD accessibility and the view that 9/11 represented the crossing of a “threshold in 
terrorist constraint and lethality”). The focus of U.S. legislators on State-based threats in the 
early decades of the Cold War paralleled similar views among international practitioners, 
including those involved in the promulgation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons (NPT). See Imrana Iqbal, International Law of Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation: 
Application to Non-State Actors, 31 PACE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW. 1, 4 (2018) (“Non-
state actors do not figure in the NPT-based arrangement.”). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2014 defines “special nuclear material” to include plutonium, enriched 
uranium, or either of their artificially created by-products. 
13. Interestingly, the legislative history of the 1980 amendments to this law similarly 
points to broad concerns of safeguarding nuclear materials, particularly following the Three-
Mile Island disaster. See S. REP. NO. 96-176, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2216, 
2219. 
14. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101; see also Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
IAEA,  https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/convention-physical 
-protection-nuclear-material (last visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
15. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-624, at 5 (1982), 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3229, 3233 (“It is not 
necessary that the actor know the actual composition of the nuclear material affected (as 
defined in proposed section 831(e)), but only that the material with which the actor is dealing 
is nuclear material.”). 
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Finally, Quadrants III and IV contain the provisions enacted following 
9/11, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332i and 832. These provisions reflect the U.S. govern-
ment’s shift in awareness that terrorist organizations pose particularly acute 
threats of nuclear violence in the modern era.16 Quadrant III’s § 2332i was 
enacted in 2015 and codified the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), which criminalizes in-
ternational acts of nuclear terrorism and encourages police and judicial co-
operation to prevent, investigate, and punish such acts.17 Under U.S. law, § 
2332i incorporates several nuclear-related offenses into the “federal crime of 
terrorism” and provides for penalties up to $2,000,000 and life imprison-
ment.18 Quadrant IV’s § 832 was enacted as part of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.19 Enacted prior to § 2332i, this pro-
vision was an initial attempt to extend post-9/11 terrorism statutes and prin-
ciples to the nuclear context. Consequently, it imposes a maximum punish-
ment of twenty-years imprisonment on anyone who “willfully participates in 
or knowingly provides material support or resources (as defined in section 
2339A) to a nuclear weapons program or other weapons of mass destruction 
program of a foreign terrorist power, or attempts or conspires to do so.” 
 
B. Relevant Case Law and Indictments 
 
Over the past seventy years, the U.S. government has promulgated the afore-
mentioned nuclear threat provisions, which today comprise the modern nu-
clear terrorism statutory schema. Federal prosecutors, however, have rela-
tively infrequently relied on these provisions to charge alleged criminals. In 
parallel with Quadrant I, the earliest judicial opinions on nuclear theft and 
 
16. See Matthew Bunn, Reducing the Greatest Risks of Nuclear Theft & Terrorism, DAEDALUS, 
Fall 2009, at 112, 112 (“In April 2009, President Obama warned that there was still a real 
danger that terrorists might get and use a nuclear bomb, calling that possibility ‘the most 
immediate and extreme threat to global security.’”). 
17. 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
Apr. 13, 2005, 2245 U.N.T.S. 89. 
18. The Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force 
and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” 28 
C.F.R. § 0.85 (2010). Additionally, under § 2332 any offenses leading to a conviction of 
homicide can lead to the imposition of the death penalty. 
19. See Brenda Sue Thornton & Ranganath Manthripragada, Eleven New Tools for Prose-
cutors, in INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, at 18 (Jan 
Donovan ed., 2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2006/ 
02/14/usab5304.pdf. 
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espionage dealt with State-centric offenses. One noteworthy case is the pros-
ecution of Klaus Fuchs, a German atomic scientist convicted of nuclear es-
pionage.20 Although he was sentenced to fourteen-years imprisonment in the 
United Kingdom, the information that Fuchs provided led to the 1951 trial 
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in the Southern District of New York for 
nuclear espionage and their eventual execution.21 
In recent years, two types of criminal prosecutions have implicated the 
nuclear threat provisions. The first, mirroring the Fuchs situation, is when 
an individual engages in nuclear theft or espionage in order to benefit a State 
actor. Interestingly, these prosecutions often focus on Title 42 offenses and 
result in successful prosecutorial outcomes. For instance, in 2016, Szuhsiung 
Ho, a Chinese engineer, was convicted in the Eastern District of Tennessee 
under § 2077 for conspiracy to unlawfully engage in the production of special 
nuclear material to China’s benefit.22 
The second type of prosecution involves the use of the nuclear threat 
provisions to charge individuals engaged in terrorist activities. On the whole, 
these prosecutions have been far less successful than the first type in leading 
to convictions under the nuclear threat provisions. For instance, Jamal al-
Fadl, a former Al-Qaeda operative, defected in the early 2000s and subse-
quently divulged substantial information to the U.S. government about 
 
20. See Klaus Fuchs Arrested for Passing Atomic Bomb Information to Soviets, HISTORY (last 
updated Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/klaus-fuchs-arrested-
for-passing-atomic-bomb-information-to-soviets (noting that Fuchs, a German-born Brit-
ish scientist who helped developed the atomic bomb, was arrested for passing top-secret 
information to the Soviet Union). 
21. See id.; see also United States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (deny-
ing the Rosenbergs’ motion for a reduction in the previously imposed sentence of death for 
espionage). Interestingly, the Rosenbergs were not charged with treason because at the time 
of the trial, the United States was not formally at war with the Soviet Union. See HISTORY, 
supra note 20. 
22. See United States v. Szuhsiung, 2016 WL 7435900, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 21, 2016); 
see also United States of America v. Sihai Cheng, 2016 WL 413077 (D. Mass. Feb. 1, 2016) 
(involving the use of § 831 to increase the applicable points under the Sentencing Guide-
lines). Another recent case involving Iranian sanctions imposed under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act is the Northern District of Illinois prosecution of Saeed 
Valadbaigi, who was indicted for unlawful nuclear-related exports to Iran. See U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office, Northern District of Illinois, Newly Unsealed Federal Indictment Charges Iranian 
Businessman with Illegally Exporting Nuclear Nonproliferation-Controlled Materials from Illinois, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (June 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/newly-
unsealed-federal-indictment-charges-iranian-businessman-illegally-exporting-0. 
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Osama bin Laden’s nuclear designs.23 Despite this testimony, which impli-
cated numerous high-profile individuals such as Mohamed Loay Bayazid, no 
convictions under any of the nuclear threat provisions resulted.24 Similarly, 
in the federal prosecution of José Padilla, another Al-Qaeda associate, alt-
hough Attorney General John Ashcroft determined that Padilla was directly 
implicated in a plot to explode a “dirty” nuclear bomb, he was never formally 
charged for this crime.25 However, a recent case that alludes to the potential 
of the nuclear threat provisions, particularly § 2332i, is United States v. Craw-
ford, which involved an attempted terrorist attack using an x-ray device.26 Alt-
hough the court did not reach the merits on the applicability of § 2332i, it 
suggested that in criminalizing new types of conduct under the federal crime 
of terrorism, Congress intended for the provision to be robust in its applica-
tion.27 
Three lessons emerge from these recent cases. First, thus far, no cases 
following the enactment of § 2332i have used the nuclear threat provisions 
to convict an alleged terrorist. This stands in marked contrast to the second 
lesson—that recent nuclear espionage cases charged under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2077 
and 2284 have frequently led to successful prosecutorial outcomes.28 Third, 
although there is limited judicial experience with the post-9/11 provisions, 
the legislative history and available case law suggest that they are intended to 
be robust enforcement tools. As discussed below, these lessons are valuable 
in crafting a strategy to effectively prosecute future nuclear terrorism cases. 
 
 
 
23. See United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, Indictment S(9) 98 Cr. 1023 
(LBS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998), http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ 
us_indictment_against_bin_laden.pdf. For a comprehensive overview of al-Fadl’s testi-
mony, see Kimberly McCloud & Matthew Osborne, WMD Terrorism and Bin Laden, MID-
DLEBURY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (July 14, 2008), https://nonprolifera-
tion.org/wmd-terrorism-and-osama-bin-laden/ (describing al-Fadl as a “star witness” in de-
tailing “his efforts to assist Bin Laden in an attempt to acquire uranium, presumably for the 
development of nuclear weapons, from a source in Khartoum, Sudan, in late 1993 or early 
1994”). 
24. See McCloud & Osborne, supra note 23. 
25. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). 
26. United States v. Crawford, 714 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
1275, 200 L. Ed. 2d 426 (2018). 
27. See id. at 31. 
28. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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III. STATUTORY SHORTCOMINGS IN  
      NUCLEAR TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 
 
This Part builds on the overview of the legal landscape by evaluating two 
specific shortcomings of U.S. criminal law vis-à-vis nuclear terrorism: inflex-
ibility and undercoverage. On inflexibility, nuclear energy is a constantly ad-
vancing field, and the activities that the U.S. government has criminalized do 
not fully reflect the current state of play. For instance, § 831 does not define 
“nuclear material” to include new materials such as thorium that can sustain 
weaponizable nuclear reactions.29 Moreover, the law does not address dual-
use technologies (DUTs) that might assist in constructing a nuclear weapon; 
rather, it only prohibits exchanges of nuclear materials.30 A related inflexibil-
ity concern is the “definitional challenge” of nuclear terrorism.31 While each 
nuclear threat provision has the potential to apply to nuclear terrorism, only 
§ 2332i explicitly incorporates its punished offenses into the federal crime of 
terrorism. Consequently, prosecutors may be uncertain about the extent to 
which the other provisions apply to nuclear terrorism cases.32 
 
29. See Thorium, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (last updated Nov. 2020), https:// 
www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/thorium.aspx; 
Zachary Hawari, Thorium’s Glow: Lighting the Way for Safe, Cheap Energy Production, 41 WILLIAM 
& MARY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 295, 295 (2016) (“Liquid fluoride 
thorium reactors (‘LFTR’) could be safe, clean, and cheap without facilitating the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons. Even so, civilian nuclear power struggles in an uphill battle for 
public acceptance. Nuclear proponents must address the legacy of Fukushima and Cherno-
byl.”); see also James A. Lake et al., Next Generation Nuclear Power, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Jan. 
26, 2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/next-generation-nuclear/ (noting 
the need for “[n]ew fuel cycles . . . to be designed to guard against proliferation”). 
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 831(a); see also GOVERNANCE OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES: THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE, AM. ACADEMY ARTS & SCIENCES 8–60 (Elisa D. Harris ed., 2016) 
(highlighting the inchoate regulatory framework that governs “dual-use technologies” such 
as laser enrichment that are suitable for both civil and military nuclear-related purposes). 
31. See generally Alex P. Schmid, The Definition of Terrorism, in THE ROUTLEDGE HAND-
BOOK OF TERRORISM RESEARCH 39, 39 (Alex P.  Schmid ed., 2011) (“More than 70 years 
after the League of Nations first proposed (in 1937) a legal definition of terrorism, such an 
agreement is still elusive.”). For more on ambiguity related to the federal crime of terrorism 
in the United States, see Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten 
Years After 9/11, 33 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF  INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1, 18–31 (2011). 
32. This uncertainty is particularly pronounced with the Title 42 nuclear threat provi-
sions, as they are facially geared toward public health and welfare considerations and there-
fore exist in certain respects outside of the federal prosecutor’s traditional domain.  
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Along with inflexibility, the nuclear threat provisions face an undercov-
erage problem in their focus on the “back-end” nuclear terrorism risk (i.e., 
detonation of nuclear weapons or attack of nuclear facilities) at the expense 
of the “front-end” risk.33 Front-end risk, addressed in passim in 18 U.S.C. § 
831 and 42 U.S.C. § 2077, comprises the preparatory steps that enable a 
would-be terrorist to carry out a nuclear attack. However, §§ 831 and 2077 
both formulate nuclear exchanges in highly transactional terms and do not 
necessarily cover actors that may unwittingly be involved in a nuclear terror-
ist’s attack, for instance, freight or shipping operators.34 These cross-border 
operators are a particular risk because these provisions require a mens rea of 
knowledge for successful prosecution, rather than the negligence mens rea 
that such actors would likely have in transporting containers holding nuclear 
weapons into the United States.35 
The undercoverage problem also extends to the U.S. government’s in-
complete adherence to its Nuclear Terrorism Convention obligations. While 
§ 2332i codifies the Convention’s provisions on defining nuclear terrorism 
offenses and prosecutorial commitments, it does not meaningfully advance 
the U.S. domestic legal regime with regard to cross-border information shar-
ing and cooperation.36 Beyond the risk of forsaking valuable intelligence 
 
33. The full scope of the back-end and front-end risks of nuclear terrorism is reflected in 
various calls to adopt a “layered approach.” See Michael Levi, ON NUCLEAR TERRORISM 7 
(2007) (“Imagine a scenario in which, at each step of its plot, a terrorist group has a 90 
percent chance of success. Then a plot requiring ten steps will have less than a 40 percent 
chance of succeeding, since its overall odds of success are reduced with each step. . . . [This] 
. . . is called a ‘layered defense.’”). 
34. For an overview of the potential threat of nuclear weapons being “snuck” into the 
United States via shipping containers, see J.M. Phelps, We Could Have Shipping Containers Full 
of Foreign Nukes in Our Ports and Not Know It, AMERICAN THINKER (Feb. 27, 2018) 
https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2018/02/we_could_have_shipping_containers_ 
full_of_foreign_nukes_in_our_ports_and_not_know_it.html. 
35. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 831(a)(1)–(7). Note also that numerous nuclear weapons contrac-
tors have been found to violate shipping guidelines for dangerous materials, pointing to an 
enforcement deficit in this area of the law. See Patrick Malone, Nuclear Weapons Contractors 
Repeatedly Violate Shipping Rules for Dangerous Materials, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Aug. 
1, 2017), https://apps.publicintegrity.org/nuclear-negligence/shipping-violations/. This 
threat is further exacerbated by the discordance between the U.S. Code’s definitions of 
“special nuclear materials” under Title 42 and “nuclear materials” under Title 18. 
36. See Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 17, arts. 7, 9, 11, 13; see also Paige 
Willan, The Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: An Old Solution to a New 
Problem, 39 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 527, 540 (2008) (“Imple-
mentation of the NTC will also not significantly improve the legal regime in the United 
States with respect to nuclear terrorism.”). 
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from foreign counterparts, these omissions entail an “expressive injury” in 
that the U.S. government’s failure to adhere to its obligations undermines 
both the efficacy of and broader commitment to the international effort 
against nuclear terrorism.37 
 
IV. CRAFTING A NUCLEAR TERRORISM PROSECUTORIAL FRAMEWORK  
 
In light of the aforementioned statutory shortcomings, this Part acknowl-
edges the need to bolster the U.S. criminal system’s current approach to nu-
clear terrorism cases. However, given the limited likelihood of direct legisla-
tive amendment, a more promising approach is to rely on prosecution-driven 
action via the NTPF, which is premised on the dual principles of consistency 
and coordination. 
 
A. Legislative Amendment: Not the Way Forward 
 
One conceivable course of action to address the gaps in the existing nuclear 
terrorism statutory schema is legislative amendment. Although this could in-
volve directly filling gaps in the law (e.g., adding “thorium” to nuclear mate-
rials under 18 U.S.C. § 831(g)(1)), a more promising route is to provide for 
the Secretary of Energy to maintain a list of criminalized materials or ex-
changes.38 Additionally, Congress could consider retrofitting the material 
support statutes to the exigencies of nuclear proliferation (e.g., criminalizing 
the receipt of nuclear aid from “foreign terrorist powers,” rather than merely 
criminalizing the provision of such aid to these powers under § 832(a)). Finally, 
the United States could apply lessons from foreign criminal codes and 
 
37. There is substantial literature on the value of adherence to international obligations 
and the political and legal fallout from failure to do so. See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, Compliance 
with International Agreements, 1 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 75 (1998). For a 
similar discussion in the nuclear security context, see Steven E. Miller, Proliferation, Disarma-
ment and the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITY 50–51 (Morten Bremer Maerli & Sverre Lodgaard eds., 2007) (noting 
that the belief among nonnuclear-weapon States that the five nuclear-weapon States have 
failed to abide to their disarmament obligations undermines the broader efficacy of the nu-
clear nonproliferation regime). 
38. Such a provision could structurally parallel the process through which the Secretary 
of State designates an organization as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2021 
460 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expand its own laws to cover more nuclear terrorism-related activities.39 
However, while legislative change is the most concrete method to amend the 
nuclear threat provisions, it is unlikely that enough political support could 
be generated to directly address their shortcomings.40 
 
B. NTPF: Consistency and Coordination 
 
Given the practical challenges of legislative amendment, this article advo-
cates for a strengthened nuclear terrorism framework that relies on prosecu-
tion-driven action. This proposed framework, the NTPF, would be incorpo-
rated into the Justice Manual’s (JM) national security section.41 Currently, JM 
9-90.440 references two laws that lie at the intersection of nuclear energy and 
national security law: the AEA and 18 U.S.C. § 831. Along with referencing 
the remaining nuclear threat provisions, the NTPF would consist of two 
guidelines: 
1. In conjunction with the Internal Security Section of the Criminal Di-
vision, the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) of the National Security Divi-
sion (NSD) should promote measures that clarify the full scope of available 
charging options in matters of national security implicating nuclear weapons, 
materials, or facilities and that emphasize the importance of consistently 
charging the most serious, readily approvable offenses. 
2. The AAG of the NSD should encourage coordination in the prose-
cutions of actors accused of using or interfering with nuclear weapons, ma-
terials, or facilities in the furtherance of an act of terror. This coordination 
 
39. For instance, the United States could consider emulating Canada’s recent laws crim-
inalizing contraventions of the 2004 International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Code 
of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and establishing regulations 
for maintaining “nuclear information security. See SARA Z. KUTCHESFAHANI ET AL., THE 
NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMITS: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE ACTIONS TO CURB NUCLEAR 
TERRORISM 2010–2016, at 28 (2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/ 
files/files/Reports/NSS_Report2018_digital.pdf. 
40. For commentary on Congress’ continued inability to pass legislation, even on tra-
ditionally bipartisan matters such as nuclear security, see Jeffrey D. Grynaviski, Congress Used 
to Pass Bipartisan Legislation—Will it Ever Again?, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://theconversation.com/congress-used-to-pass-bipartisan-legislation-will-it-ever-
again-107134. 
41. The JM is a reference for United States Attorneys and other employees of the DOJ 
responsible for the prosecution of violations of federal law. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, JUSTICE MANUAL (2018).  JM 9-90.000 contains provisions on national security. See 
also National Security, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
90000-national-security (last visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
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should extend to both intra-agency efforts and international efforts not al-
ready provided for by law. 
A recommended course of action to promote the first guideline is for 
the NSD AAG to distribute a memorandum that emphasizes the importance 
of contingency preparedness in nuclear terrorism prosecutions and reiterates 
the nuclear threat provisions and the penalties they impose. While such a 
memorandum could take several forms, articulating the full scope of charges 
and the importance of charging all applicable offenses would certainly help 
serve the goals of consistency and effective deterrence.42 
A second recommendation to promote consistency is for the NSD to 
make a concerted effort to bring future nuclear terrorism cases before a sin-
gle federal district. Pursuant to the AAG’s discretion outlined in JM 9-
90.100, the AAG may assign criminal cases involving national security within 
the NSD rather than leaving “prosecution of national security cases [to] . . . 
the USAO [U.S. Attorney’s Office] in the district where venue lies.” There-
fore, the AAG might consider assigning nuclear terrorism prosecutions to 
the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) due to both prosecutorial and 
judicial experience with past terrorism prosecutions as well as the S.D.N.Y.’s 
“related-case rule.”43 This case-assignment rule allows a judge to take on a 
case if a moving party claims that it is sufficiently related to another of the 
judge’s cases. Although this rule gained notoriety in the stop-and-frisk con-
text,44 provided that S.D.N.Y. prosecutors comply with the now-modified 
requirements for establishing relatedness, they could bring future nuclear ter-
rorism prosecutions before a single judge who has some degree of fluency 
in the subject. In so doing, this judge could help develop a jurisprudence that 
clarifies the applicability of the nuclear threat provisions in the nuclear 
 
42. For a useful template for this type of memorandum, see Memorandum from At-
torney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors: Department Policy Concerning 
Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm. 
43. Even if the AAG chooses not to exercise this discretion, the Southern District of 
New York would still be a wise choice to develop a judge-centric jurisprudence, as a sub-
stantial number of terrorism prosecutions have been tried in this district over the past three 
decades. For more on the related-case rule, see Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Federal 
Court Alters Rules on Judge Assignments, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.ny-
times.com/2013/12/24/nyregion/federal-court-alters-rules-on-judge-assignments.html 
(“The rule is commonly used to send cases involving similar facts to a single judge in the 
interest of efficiency and economy, but it has also evoked concerns about judge-shopping.”). 
44. See generally Katherine Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the 
S.D.N.Y.’s ‘Related Cases’ Rule Has Shaped the Evolution of Stop-and-Frisk Law, 19 MICHIGAN 
JOURNAL OF RACE & LAW 199, 205 (2014). 
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terrorism context and thus offers flexibility in using these provisions as 
charging options. 
In order to encourage the second guideline’s coordination objective, one 
recommendation is to enhance intra-agency coordination on nuclear terror-
ism intelligence. JM 9-90.4400 already discusses required communications 
between the DOJ and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (a Department 
of Energy agency) on AEA prosecutions.45 However, the DOJ could benefit 
from enhanced intelligence coordination with several other federal agencies, 
including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the 
National Reconnaissance Office. While the intelligence and law-enforce-
ment equities that bear on typical DOJ file-search and document-review re-
quests would likely also arise in nuclear terrorism investigations, the sensitive 
and technical evidence unique to this subject counsel toward developing ro-
bust and sustained intra-agency networks.46 Likewise, the DOJ would benefit 
from closer relationships with agencies that provide expert analysis on nu-
clear intelligence, including the State Department and the Treasury Depart-
ment’s Bureau of Tobacco, Alcohol, and Firearms.47 These networks could 
take several forms, including intra-agency memoranda of understanding or 
reliance on existing channels such as joint terrorism task forces (JTTF).48 
Finally, the second guideline’s focus on international coordination reit-
erates the importance of the U.S. government’s full adherence to its Nuclear 
Terrorism Convention obligations, particularly its Article 13 commitments 
to cross-border information sharing. While legislative amendment is not a 
practical avenue to address this undercoverage problem, the DOJ can still 
take meaningful steps to encourage cross-border evidence and intelligence 
 
45. The AEA provides that prosecutions shall be commenced by the Attorney General 
after they have notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2271(c). 
46. See JM 9-90.210, Contacts with the Intelligence Community Regarding Criminal Investigations 
or Prosecutions, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-90000-national-security#9-90.210 (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2020). The scope of “sensitive” information in the nuclear security and 
terrorism contexts is unsurprisingly broad. See IAEA, IMPLEMENTING GUIDE: SECURITY 
OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 23-G, 2015), 
https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1677web-32045715.pdf. 
47. See ADVISORY PANEL ON OVERSEAS SECURITY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE’S ADVISORY PANEL ON OVERSEAS SECURITY (1985), https://fas.org/irp/threat/in-
man/. 
48. A potentially relevant JTTF-inspired initiative is the Joint Counterterrorism Assess-
ment Team’s Intelligence Guide for First Responders. See JCAT: Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE., https://www. 
dni.gov/nctc/jcat/jcat_ctguide/intel_guide.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
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sharing on nuclear proliferation matters.49 One such step is for the NSD 
AAG to promulgate a set of guidelines that describes when each USAO’s 
National/International Security Coordinator should share nuclear infor-
mation with an intelligence agency or a foreign counterpart.50 
Relatedly, the NSD could develop practices promoting nuclear intelli-
gence sharing that rely on established channels of communication with for-
eign counterparts. For instance, the cooperative efforts of U.S. and Kenyan 
authorities that led to the detention of Wadih El-Hage in connection with 
the bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa could certainly expand to 
future investigations of individuals suspected of nuclear terrorism-related ac-
tivities.51 As of 2020, the DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Develop-
ment Assistance and Training operates approximately fifty international pro-
grams through which the DOJ works with foreign counterparts to combat 
transnational crimes and terrorism.52 Reliance on these training programs 
and more informal modes of outreach would help bring the U.S. government 
further in line with its international obligations and undoubtedly bolster 
cross-border prevention of nuclear terrorism. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For nearly three decades, most world leaders have shared the view that a 
terrorist organization’s acquisition of nuclear weapons poses the most “im-
mediate and extreme threat to global security.”53 Despite this threat, the U.S. 
 
49. Federal prosecutors are vested with expansive investigatory and intelligence-sharing 
powers, particularly as these powers relate to national security matters. As a result, DOJ 
protocol provides for a systematic exercise of this authority in each USAO, including 
through the establishment of a national/international security coordinator position in each 
Office. See JM 9-90.050, National/International Security Coordinators in United States Attorneys’ 
Offices, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-90000-national-security#9-90.050 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2021). 
50. For a template to promulgate such a set of guidelines, see Memorandum from the 
Attorney General to the Deputy Attorney General et al.: Coordination of Information Re-
lating to Terrorism (Apr. 11, 2002), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/e0507/app7.htm. 
51. See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008). 
52. See Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT), U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-opdat (last visited Feb. 2, 
2021).  
53. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic 
(Apr. 5, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
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criminal system still faces considerable statutory shortcomings in enforcing 
its nuclear terrorism laws. In light of these shortcomings, this article has sug-
gested guidelines and several courses of action that could undergird an en-
hanced NTPF. Moving forward, the lessons learned from crafting such a 
framework can be applied to other areas of national security law, including 
biological and chemical terrorism, genetic engineering, and cyberterrorism. 
Perhaps the most important lesson, however, is the significance of prosecu-
tion-driven action. While robust prosecutorial practices often supplement 
effective statutory schemes, in many situations they can serve as worka-
rounds to less-than-effective schemes. Consequently, prosecutors should re-
main mindful of their ability to engage in policymaking and advocacy in or-
der to support the U.S. government’s broader enforcement and security ob-
jectives. 
 
 
 
president-barack-obama-prague-delivered (Prague speech on nuclear weapons); see also JO-
SEPH CIRINCIONE, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY & FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 139 
(2008) (“There are three problems, however, that are more difficult to resolve. . . . [These] 
most difficult nuclear threats [are] terrorism, technology, and new weapon states.”). 
